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Coordination, the process by which an agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated)
actions of others to try and ensure the community acts in a coherent manner, is perhaps the key
problem of the discipline of Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence (DAI). In order to make advances it
is important that the theories and principles which guide this central activity are uncovered and
analysed in a systematic and rigourous manner. To this end, this paper models agent communities
using a distributed goal search formalism, and argues that commitments (pledges to undertake a
speciﬁc course of action) and conventions (means of monitoring commitments in changing
circumstances) are the foundation of coordination in all DAI systems.
1. The Coordination Problem
Participation in any social situation should be both simultaneously constraining, in that agents
must make a contribution to it, and yet enriching, in that participation provides resources and
opportunities which would otherwise be unavailable (Gerson, 1976). Coordination, the process
by which an agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated) actions of others to try
and ensure the community acts in a coherent manner, is the key to achieving this objective.
Without coordination the benefits of decentralised problem solving vanish and the community
may quickly degenerate into a collection of chaotic, incohesive individuals. In more detail, the
objectives of the coordination process are to ensure: that all necessary portions of the overall
problem are included in the activities of at least one agent, that agents interact in a manner which
permits their activities to be developed and integrated into an overall solution, that team
members act in a purposeful and consistent manner, and that all of these objectives are
achievable within the available computational and resource limitations (Lesser and Corkill,
1987). Specific examples of coordination activities include supplying timely information to
needy agents, ensuring the actions of multiple actors are synchronised and avoiding redundant
problem solving.
There are three main reasons why the actions of multiple agents need to be coordinated:
• because there are dependencies between agents’ actions
Interdependence occurs when goals undertaken by individual agents are related - either
because local decisions made by one agent have an impact on the decisions of other
community members (eg when building a house, decisions about the size and location
of rooms impacts upon the wiring and plumbing) or because of the possibility of
harmful interactions amongst agents (eg two mobile robots may attempt to pass
through a narrow exit simultaneously, resulting in a collision, damage to the robots and
blockage of the exit).Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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• because there is a need to meet global constraints
Global constraints exist when the solution being developed by a group of agents must
satisfy certain conditions if it is to be deemed successful. For instance, a house building
team may have a budget of £250,000, a distributed monitoring system may have to
react to critical events within 30 seconds and a distributed air traffic control system
may have to control the planes with a fixed communication bandwidth. If individual
agents acted in isolation and merely tried to optimise their local performance, then such
overarching constraints are unlikely to be satisfied. Only through coordinated action
will acceptable solutions be developed.
• because no one individual has sufficient competence, resources or information to solve
the entire problem
Many problems cannot be solved by individuals working in isolation because they do
not possess the necessary expertise, resources or information. Relevant examples
include the tasks of lifting a heavy object, driving in a convoy and playing a symphony.
It may be impractical or undesirable to permanently synthesize the necessary
components into a single entity because of historical, political, physical or social
constraints, therefore temporary alliances through cooperative problem solving may be
the only way to proceed. Differing expertise may need to be combined to produce a
result outside of the scope of any of the individual constituents (eg in medical
diagnosis, knowledge about heart disease, blood disorders and respiratory problems
may need to be combined to diagnose a patient’s illness). Different agents may have
different resources (eg processing power, memory and communications) which all
need to be harnessed to solve a complex problem. Finally, different agents may have
different information or viewpoints of a problem (eg in concurrent engineering
systems, the same product may be viewed from a design, manufacturing and marketing
perspective).
Even when individuals can work independently, meaning coordination is not essential,
information discovered by one agent can be of sufficient use to another that the two agents can
solve the problem more than twice as fast. For example, when searching for a lost object in a
large area it is often better, though not essential, to do so as a team. Analysis of this
“combinatorial implosion” phenomena (Kornfield and Hewitt, 1981) has resulted in the
postulation that cooperative search, when sufficiently large, can display universal
characteristics which are independent of the nature of either the individual processes or the
particular domain being tackled (Clearwater et al., 1991).
If all the agents in the system could have complete knowledge of the goals, actions and
interactions of their fellow community members and could also have infinite processing power,
it would be possible to know exactly what each agent was doing at present and what it is
intending to do in the future. In such instances, it would be possible to avoid conflicting and
redundant efforts and systems could be perfectly coordinated (Malone, 1987). However such
complete knowledge is infeasible, in any community of reasonable complexity, because
bandwidth limitations make it impossible for agents to be constantly informed of all
developments. Even in modestly sized communities, a complete analysis to determine the
detailed activities of each agent is impractical - the computation and communication costs of
determining the optimal set and allocation of activities far outweighs the improvement in
problem solving performance (Corkill and Lesser, 1986).Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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As all community members cannot have a complete and accurate perspective of the overall
system, the next easiest way of ensuring coherent behaviour is to have one agent with a wider
picture. This global controller could then direct the activities of the others, assign agents to tasks
and focus problem solving to ensure coherent behaviour. However such an approach is often
impractical in realistic applications because even keeping one agent informed of all the actions
in the community would swamp the available bandwidth. Also the controller would become a
severe communication bottleneck and would render the remaining components unusable if it
failed.
To produce systems without bottlenecks and which exhibit graceful degradation of
performance, most DAI research has concentrated on developing communities in which both
control and data are distributed. Distributed control means that individuals have a degree of
autonomy in generating new actions and in deciding which tasks to do next. When designing
such systems it is important to ensure that agents spend the bulk of their time engaged on
solving the domain level problems for which they were built, rather than in communication
and coordination activities. To this end, the community should be decomposed into the most
modular units possible. However the designer should ensure that these units are of sufﬁcient
granularity to warrant the overhead inherent in goal distribution - distributing small tasks can
prove more expensive than performing them in one place (Durfee et al., 1987).
The disadvantage of distributing control and data is that knowledge of the system’s overall state
is dispersed throughout the community and each individual has only a partial and imprecise
perspective. Thus there is an increased degree of uncertainty about each agent’s actions,
meaning that it more difficult to attain coherent global behaviour - for example, agents may
spread misleading and distracting information, multiple agents may compete for unshareable
resources simultaneously, agents may unwittingly undo the results of each others activities and
the same actions may be carried out redundantly. Also the dynamics of such systems can
become extremely complex, giving rise to nonlinear oscillations and chaos (Huberman and
Hogg, 1988). In such cases the coordination process becomes correspondingly more difficult as
well as more important1.
To develop better and more integrated models of coordination, and hence improve the
efficiency and utility of DAI systems, it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the
fundamental concepts which underpin agent interactions. The first step in this analysis is to
determine the perspective from which coordination should be described. When viewing agents
from a purely behaviouristic (external) perspective, it is, in general, impossible to determine
whether they have coordinated their actions. Firstly, actions may be incoherent even if the
agents tried to coordinate their behaviour. This may occur, for instance, because their models
of each other or of the environment are incorrect. For example, robot1 may see robot2 heading
for exit2 and, based on this observation and the subsequent deduction that it will use this exit,
decide to use exit1. However if robot2 is heading towards exit2 to pick up a particular item and
actually intends to use exit1 then there may be incoherent behaviour (both agents attempting to
use the same exit) although there was coordination. Secondly, even if there is coherent action,
it may not be as a consequence of coordination. For example imagine a group of people are
sitting in a park (Searle, 1990). As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the
middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is uncoordinated
behaviour because each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet and
 1. Similar experiences have also been noted in organisational science: the greater the task uncertainty, the greater
the amount of information which must be processed among decision makers during task execution in order to
achieve a given level of performance (Galbraith, 1973).Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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even if they are aware of what others are doing and what their goals are, it does not affect their
action. This contrasts with the situation in which the people are dancers and the choreography
calls for them to converge on a common point (the tree). In this case the individuals are
performing exactly the same actions as before, but it is coordinated behaviour because they each
have the aim of meeting at the central point as a consequence of the overall aim of executing
the dance. For these two reasons, the coordination process is best studied by examining the
internal structure of the individual agents (i.e. the agents’ beliefs, desires, preferences,
intentions, and so on).
Having decided upon a perspective, the next decisions concern the model that will be used to
describe the problem and the structures that will be used to describe the agents. Here a
distributed goal search formalism is used to characterise DAI systems (section 2) and the key
agent structures are commitment and convention (section three). This model of coordination is
founded upon the “Centrality of Commitments and Conventions Hypothesis” which states that:
all coordination mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to commitments and their associated
(social) conventions. Commitments are viewed as pledges to undertake a specified course of
action, while conventions provide a means of monitoring commitments in changing
circumstances. The former provide a degree of predictability so that agents can take the (future)
activities of others into consideration when dealing with inter-agent dependencies, global
constraints or resource utilization conﬂicts. The latter provide the ﬂexibility which cooperating
agents need if they are to cope with being situated in dynamic environments. To operate
effectively when the external world and their own beliefs are constantly changing, agents must
possess a mechanism for evaluating whether existing commitments are still valid. Conventions
provide this mechanism: deﬁning the conditions under which commitments should be
reassessed and specifying the associated actions which should be undertaken in such situations.
Finally, section four investigates three prominent coordination techniques (organisational
structuring, meta-level information exchange and multi-agent planning) and shows how they
can all be reformulated in terms of commitments and conventions - thus providing further
evidence for the main claim of this paper.
2. Modelling Distributed AI Systems as a Distributed Goal Search Problem
Several authors have recently characterised DAI as a form of distributed goal search with
multiple loci of control (Durfee and Montgomery, 1991; Gasser, 1992; Jennings, 1993; Lesser,
1991). Adopting Lesser’s basic formalism, the actions of Agent1 and Agent2 in solving goals
G1
0 and G2
0 respectively can be expressed as a classical AND/OR goal structure search2
(ﬁgure 1). The classical graph structure has been augmented to include a representation of the
interdependencies between the goals and to indicate the resources needed to solve the
primitive goals (leaf nodes). Interdependencies can exist between high level sibling goals, such
as G1
1 and G1
2, or they can be more distant in the goal structure (eg between G1
1,1 and G2
p,2).
In the latter case, G1
1 and G2
p become interacting goals if G1
1,1 is used to solve G1
1. Indirect




j). Resource dependencies can be removed simply by providing more of the
resource in question; dependencies between goals, on the other hand, cannot be circumvented
as they are a logical consequence of the community’s environment. In all other aspects, the two
types of dependency are identical.
 2. Figure 1 represents a typical multi-agent situation in which each individual has its own goals, but it must
interact with others to achieve them. In contrast, a distributed problem solving system would have a single root
node corresponding to the common objective.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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Interdependencies can be classiﬁed along two orthogonal dimensions: whether they are weak
or strong, and whether they are uni-directional or bi-directional. Strong dependencies must be
satisﬁed if the dependent goal is to succeed; weak dependencies facilitate or constrain problem
solving but need not be fulﬁlled for the dependent goal to succeed. An example of a strong
dependency is where the output of a goal (G) is a mandatory input (I) for the dependent goal
(DG) and where G is the only source of I in the community. A weak dependency exists if there
is more than one source for I or if I is an optional input for DG. A uni-directional dependency
(written G1
1,1→ G2
p,2) means that agent2’s goal Gp,2 is dependent (either strongly or weakly)
on agent1’s goal G1,1, but G1
1,1 is unaffected by G2
p,2; with bi-directional dependencies
(written G1
m,1↔ G2
m,2) the goals of both agents are affected. The provision of information I
by goal G for DG is an example of a uni-directional dependency (G→ DG); a bi-directional
dependence occurs, for example, when two goals need to be performed simultaneously.
The nature of the inter-agent dependencies is the critical determinant of the type of
coordination which will take place. For example, if Agent1 knows that G2
p,2,2 requires
resource d1
j before it can start (strong dependency, uni-directional), then it may decide to
execute G1
m,1,2 (to produce the necessary resource) before G1
m,1,1 if there is no other
information distinguishing between these two alternatives. Secondly, the relationship between
G1
m,1 and G2
m,2 may stipulate that both actions need to be performed simultaneously (strong
dependency, bi-directional) in which case the two agents need to reach an agreement about the
respective execution times. Finally, if Agent1 chose G1
1,1 as a means of satisfying G1
1 the
result of this task may provide valuable information (weak dependency, uni-directional) which
Agent2 could use when solving G2










































Figure 1: A distributed goal search tree involving Agent1 and Agent2. The dotted arrows indicate
interdependencies between goals and data in different agents, solid arrows dependencies within an agent.
The superscripts associated with goals and data indicate the agent which contains them (Jennings, 1993).
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be signiﬁcantly shorter). Knowing this, Agent1 will invoke an information sharing form of
cooperation to supply Agent2 with the necessary result when it becomes available.
It was necessary to extend Lesser’s graph formalism to allow joint goals (eg G1,2
m) because
joint goals are the basis of joint action (i.e. there can be no joint action unless there is ﬁrst a
joint goal). Joint actions are a sophisticated form of cooperation in which a team of agents
decide to pursue a common goal in a cooperative manner (this contrasts with simpler forms of
cooperation such as asking an agent to perform a single task or spontaneously volunteering
relevant information to interested acquaintances). This form of interaction can be characterised
as having the following properties: (i) the team members are mutually responsive to one
another, (ii) the team members have a joint commitment to the joint activity, and (iii) the team
members are committed to be mutually supportive of one another during the pursuit of their
joint objective (Bratman, 1992). Joint goals differ from individual goals in that they are not
directly associated with actions - for this reason, they must be mapped onto individual goals as
only individual agents have the ability to act (perform domain level tasks). However joint
goals can be in the mind of each individual which is acting as part of the collective, implying
that everything necessary for team behaviour can be possessed by individual agents, even
though the aim makes reference to the collective. Thus the joint goal G1,2
m is internalised
within Agent1 and Agent2 and results in Agent1 performing G1
m,1 and Agent2 performing
G2
m,2.
Lesser (1991) makes the following general observations about the graph formalism. The entire
goal structure need not be fully elaborated in order for problem solving to begin, it may be
constructed as problem solving progresses. Developing the graph can be a complex social
activity involving negotiation, persuasion and the resolution of conﬂicts or it may be
undertaken centrally by one agent. Construction can involve a top-down elaboration based on
higher-level goals, a bottom-up process driven by the data, or a mixture of the two. Finally, the
formalism says nothing about whether the structure is statically deﬁned or evolves
dynamically from a composite view of the current, local goal structures of the individual
agents.
Formulating a multi-agent system in this manner allows the activities which may require
coordination to be clearly identiﬁed. Such activities include: (i) deﬁning the goal graph
(including identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of interdependencies); (ii) assigning particular
regions of the graph to appropriate agents; (iii) controlling decisions about which areas of the
graph to explore; (iv) traversing the goal structure; and (v) ensuring that successful traversal of
the search space is reported. Some of these activities may be collaborative and some may be
carried out by an individual acting in isolation. Determining the approach adopted for each of
the various phases is a matter of system design. It will depend upon the nature of the domain
(eg in applications in which agents have distinct expertise, assignment of goals simply
becomes a matter of identifying the individual capable of performing the activity), the type of
agents included in the community (eg with autonomous agents, the global search space is
given by the union of the local search spaces and each agent works on its own local goals), and
the desired solution characteristics (eg to increase the likelihood of an important result being
produced, the same area of the search space may be redundantly assigned to multiple agents,
whereas if the desire is to optimise agent usage then such an arrangement is inefﬁcient). This
paper concentrates on the problems of deciding which areas of the graph to explore, actually
executing the goal structure and ensuring that successful traversal of the goal graph is reported.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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3. The Commitment and Convention Model of Coordination
This section describes the process of coordination in terms of the distributed goal graph of the
previous section and shows that commitments and conventions are the key mechanisms
controlling this activity. This section also argues for the centrality of commitments and
conventions hypothesis which states that:
All coordination mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to
commitments and their associated conventions
(Jennings, 1993)
3.1 Detailing Commitments and Conventions
This subsection provides a more precise characterisation of the properties of commitments
(section 3.1.1), joint commitments (section 3.1.2), conventions (section 3.1.3) and social
conventions (section 3.1.4) before section 3.2 shows how they are the key to the coordination
process.
3.1.1 Commitments
Commitments can be seen to have a number of important properties (Becker, 1960; Bond,
1989; Bratman, 1987; Dennett, 1987; Fikes, 1982; Searle, 1983). Agents can make pledges
about both actions and beliefs and these pledges can either be about the future or the past. Thus
agent A can commit itself to play cricket tomorrow (object of commitment = action, time =
future) and agent B can commit itself to believe a particular version of events about the reasons
for the start of World War I (object of commitment = belief, time = past). For the purposes of
coordination, however, the most important commitments are related to present and future
beliefs and actions. No fundamental differences between pledges which are internalised within
an agent (eg I will lose 12 pounds in weight) and pledges which are made to a second party (eg
I will ﬁx your car for you) are assumed. Commitments may be conditional - for example, A
will play cricket tomorrow if the weather is sunny. Finally, a pledge to undertake an activity
involves an associated commitment about the resources required to carry out that action. If A
pledges to play cricket tomorrow, then it is also devoting its resources of time and energy to
this activity.
If an agent commits itself to perform a particular action then, provided that its circumstances
do not change, it will endeavour to honour that pledge. This obligation constrains an agent’s
subsequent decisions about undertaking fresh activities since it knows that sufﬁcient resources
must be reserved to honour its existing commitments. If an agent had inﬁnite resources which
could be freely allocated to any permutation of its commitments then there would be no such
restrictions. However as most resources are ﬁnite, and constraints are often imposed by the
environment, an agent is limited in the number and type of commitments it can make. For this
reason, an agent’s commitments should, as far as it is aware, be both internally consistent and
consistent with its beliefs.
Commitments can be made at many different levels and have correspondingly different time
horizons. When Agent1 pledges to perform G1
0 this will invariably be a high level objective
(eg diagnose faults in an electricity network) to which it will probably remain committed for
some considerable amount of time. The leaf nodes, on the other hand, will involve fairly
speciﬁc courses of action (eg see if there is a fault in low voltage line1) and will have a
correspondingly shorter duration.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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Generally, the greater the degree of accuracy to which an agent knows its acquaintances’
commitments, the more detailed its predictions can be and so the more coherently the
community will behave. However it is not always desirable to transmit all of the low-level
details about commitments - rather agents should communicate at a sufﬁciently detailed level
to promote satisfactory coordination, but at a sufﬁciently abstract level to ensure agents retain
a degree of ﬂexibility in achieving their objectives in an uncertain environment. For example,
knowing that Agent2 is committed to G2
0, gives no indication of whether G2
p,1 will be
performed. However knowing that Agent2 is committed to G2
p means that it is possible to
predict that G2
p,1 will indeed be performed and that Agent1 can delay its processing of G1
1,2 to
beneﬁt from the weak, uni-directional dependence. Even if Agent2 communicated a more
detailed description of its commitments, for instance that it will perform G2
p,1,3, this
information will be of no additional beneﬁt to Agent1 since it is not dependent on how G2
p,1 is
achieved. Not sending details of how G2
p,1 will be achieved also leaves Agent2 unconstrained




When agents decide to pursue a joint action, they must jointly commit themselves to a joint
goal which will bring about the desired state of affairs (Cohen and Levesque, 1991; Grosz and
Sidner, 1990; Jennings, 1992; Kinny et al., 1992; Rao et al., 1992; Searle, 1990; Tuomela and
Miller, 1988). This joint commitment has all the aforementioned properties of individual
commitment, but it has the additional constraint that it involves more than one agent3. This
means the overall state of the joint commitment is distributed. (In contrast, with individual
commitments the agent which has made the pledge is aware of its exact status as it forms part
of its internal state). So, for example, the state of the joint commitment to the joint goal G1,2
m
is distributed between Agent1 in its processing of G1
m,1 and Agent2 in its processing of G2
m,2.
Ideally all team members should have access to a shared mental state related to the joint
commitment as this would ensure that they all have the same experiences and beliefs
simultaneously. In such cases there would be no divergence amongst the group’s members.
However since joint actions are undertaken by individuals, and not the team en masse, it is the
individuals which have ﬁrst exposure to events related to the joint commitment. Thus a shared
mental state is impossible, unless all the agents possess a single common structure which
records all of their beliefs about the joint commitment (i.e. agents cannot have any local or
private beliefs about the joint action). For example in a team search, if one agent satisﬁes the
group’s objective by ﬁnding the target item, then at that precise instant in time it is the only one
which knows that the joint commitment has been fulﬁlled. This agent may subsequently
inform the others of its achievements, meaning they all share a common perspective once
more; however, in the meantime, the cooperating agents have diverged in their beliefs about
the joint commitment.
3.1.3 Conventions
An agent should honour its commitments provided that its circumstances do not change.
However in the majority of realistic scenarios agents are situated in time-varying and
unpredictable contexts - the external world may change, the agent may become aware of new
information, another agent may attempt to interact with it, and so on (Jennings, 1994).
Therefore in many cases an agent’s beliefs and desires will change between the making of a
commitment and the associated intention actually being performed - in fact, the longer the time
between these two events, the greater the likelihood of a change occurring. In some instances
 3. A joint commitment involving one agent is equivalent to an individual commitment.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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these changes will leave the agent’s commitments unaffected, but in other cases commitments
may need to be reviewed. For example, if agent A is informed that the ﬁrst customer at a new
garage opening tomorrow will receive a Ferrari, then it may indeed revise its commitments
about playing cricket. Therefore commitments should be relatively stable over time, but they
should not be irrevocable.
To operate successfully and intelligently, agents need general policies for governing the
reconsideration of their commitments. These conventions describe circumstances under which
an agent should reconsider its commitments. They also indicate the appropriate course of
action to either retain, rectify or abandon these commitments. An agent may have several
different conventions at its disposal, although each of its commitments should be tracked using
precisely one convention.
When specifying conventions a balance needs to be reached between constantly reconsidering
all commitments (which will enable the agent to respond rapidly to changing circumstances,
but will mean that it spends a signiﬁcant percentage of its time reasoning about action rather
than actually carrying out useful tasks) and never reconsidering commitments (which means
agents spend most of their time acting, but what they are actually doing may not be particularly
relevant in the light of subsequent changes). Kinny and Georgeff (1991) carried out a series of
experiments in which different conventions were examined in environments exhibiting
different rates of change. In all cases it was found that the “bold” agents (those which never
reconsidered their commitments) performed better than the “normal” agents (those which are
slightly more open to reconsideration) which were better than the “cautious” agents (those
which were prone to reconsideration). However in rapidly changing and uncertain contexts,
the utility of a relatively sophisticated convention is signiﬁcantly increased. Indeed empirical
evaluation has shown that in such circumstances conventions play a pivotal role in ensuring
the community acts in a coherent manner (Jennings and Mamdani, 1992).
The lists of both the situations under which commitments should be reassessed and the actions
which should be taken in such circumstances can be empty. So an agent can remain
permanently committed to a goal even if it has been achieved or an agent can take no action as
a result of changes in its circumstances. By means of an illustration, ﬁgure 2 shows a
convention based upon Cohen and Levesque’s (1990) model of individual rational behaviour -
it shows that an agent can renege upon a commitment if it believes that the commitment is
satisﬁed or unattainable or if the motivation for the commitment is no longer present.
CONVENTION: Cohen and Levesque Model
REASONS FOR RE-ASSESSING COMMITMENT:
• COMMITMENT SATISFIED
• COMMITMENT UNATTAINABLE
• MOTIVATION FOR COMMITMENT NO LONGER PRESENT
ACTIONS:
R1: IF COMMITMENT SATISFIED OR
COMMITMENT UNATTAINABLE OR
MOTIVATION FOR COMMITMENT NO LONGER PRESENT
THEN DROP COMMITMENT
Figure 2: Sample ConventionContribution to Foundations of DAI
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3.1.4 Social Conventions
Although conventions play an important role in DAI systems, they are essentially asocial
constructs. They describe how an agent should monitor its commitments, but they do not
specify how an agent should behave towards its fellow community members if it alters or
modiﬁes its commitments. For goals which are unrelated to other activities this stance is
sufﬁcient. However for goals which are inter-dependent, it is essential that the relevant
acquaintances are informed of any substantial change which affects their processing, if the
community is to act in a coherent manner. For this reason, agents need social conventions
which specify how to behave with respect to the other community members when their
commitments alter. Designing such conventions is a skilful activity. On the one hand it is
important that relevant information pertaining to changes in commitment is disseminated at the
earliest possible opportunity; on the other hand, agents should not broadcast information about
their commitments each and every time they change because this will over burden the
communication resources and needlessly distract the recipients. A sample social convention
which reﬂects this trade-off is shown in ﬁgure 3.
Ideally the participants should be mutually aware of the convention which governs their
interaction. Such awareness is needed if the agents are to minimise the uncertainty in their
collaboration and maximise the beneﬁt of the joint action. Thus, for example, if Agent2 must
have resource d1
j to perform G2
p,2,2 then it will invoke a task sharing form of cooperation and
ask Agent1 to make this resource available. However merely asking for d1
j to be produced is
not sufﬁcient because Agent2 also wants to be informed when it is available. To ensure the
necessary dissemination occurs, Agent2 must request that the resource be produced using an
appropriate social convention (eg that of ﬁgure 3). Whether Agent1 accepts this proposal will
depend upon its personal preferences and the relative authority of the two agents. If the
proposal is acceptable, or if Agent2 can force Agent1 to use it, then the convention will be
adopted. If the proposal is unacceptable, then the two agents will have to enter a negotiation
phase to decide upon an acceptable solution. Alternatively, rather than having to determine the
social convention for each and every interdependent goal at run time, which will signiﬁcantly
slow down processing, the system designer may stipulate that when two agents interact they
SOCIAL CONVENTION: Limited-Bandwidth
INVOKE WHEN:
• LOCAL COMMITMENT DROPPED
• LOCAL COMMITMENT SATISFIED
ACTIONS:
R1: IF LOCAL COMMITMENT SATISFIED
THEN INFORM ALL RELATED COMMITMENTS
R2: IF LOCAL COMMITMENT DROPPED BECAUSE UNATTAINABLE OR MOTIVATION
NOT PRESENT
THEN INFORM ALL STRONGLY RELATED COMMITMENTS
R3: IF LOCAL COMMITMENT DROPPED BECAUSE UNATTAINABLE OR MOTIVATION
NOT PRESENT
AND COMMUNICATION RESOURCES NOT OVERBURDENED
THEN INFORM ALL WEAKLY RELATED COMMITMENTS
Figure 3: Sample Social ConventionContribution to Foundations of DAI
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will always use a particular convention. He may even specify that the whole community must
use a particular convention for all their joint actions.
The social conventions speciﬁed up to this point have all been concerned with inter-related
individual goals. However all joint actions must have an overarching joint goal and a
corresponding joint commitment. This begs the question: how does the social convention for a
joint commitment differ from the social convention of an individual commitment which is
related to other goals? The answer to this question lies in the mutual support requirement of
joint actions. The minimum form of mutual support that a team of cooperating agents should
provide to one another is to share information about: (i) the status of their commitment to the
shared objective; (ii) the status of their commitment to the given team framework4. If an
agent’s beliefs about either of these issues change, then it is part of the intuitive semantics of
joint commitments that all team members are informed. As many joint actions depend upon the
participation of all their team members, a change of commitment by one participant can also
jeopardise the whole group’s efforts. Hence if an agent comes to believe that a fellow team
member is no longer jointly committed, it also needs to reassess its own position with respect
to the joint action. These three basic assumptions are encoded in a convention which represents
the minimum state of affairs for joint commitments (ﬁgure 4). Thus whereas any convention
can be used for individual commitments (even for those which have related goals), joint
commitments require each team member to adhere to the basic joint action convention. In
some applications it may be desirable to have more sophisticated joint action conventions, but
in every case they must still incorporate these fundamental ideals.
3.2 Commitments and Conventions: The Cornerstones of Coordination
Durfee et al., (1989) identify three major ingredients which must be present for successful
coordination: (i) there must be structures which enable the agents to interact in predictable
 4.This stipulation covers the situation in which an agent which is initially committed to the joint action decides to
leave the team, but continues to pursue the joint objective in an individualistic manner. Detecting this situation is
important because the agent which is no longer committed to the team framework will follow its own solution
path, without considering its effects on those remaining in the original team.
BASIC JOINT ACTION CONVENTION
INVOKE WHEN:
• STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO JOINT GOAL CHANGES
• STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO ATTAINING JOINT ACTION IN
PRESENT TEAM CONTEXT CHANGES
• STATUS OF JOINT COMMITMENT OF A TEAM MEMBER CHANGES
ACTIONS:
R1: IF STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO JOINT ACTION CHANGES OR
STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO PRESENT TEAM CONTEXT CHANGES
THEN INFORM ALL OTHER TEAM MEMBERS OF CHANGE
R2: IF STATUS OF JOINT COMMITMENT OF A TEAM MEMBER CHANGES
THEN DETERMINE WHETHER JOINT COMMITMENT STILL VIABLE
Figure 4: Basic Joint Action ConventionContribution to Foundations of DAI
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ways; (ii) there must be ﬂexibility so that agents can operate in dynamic environments and can
cope with their inherently partial and imprecise viewpoint of the community; and (iii) the
agents must have sufﬁcient knowledge and reasoning capabilities to exploit the available
structure and the ﬂexibility. The ﬁnal component, which they fail to explicitly mention, is the
necessity of structures to provide mutual support to the cooperating agents. In the remainder of
this subsection it is shown that: commitments provide the necessary structure for predictable
interactions, conventions provide the ﬂexibility needed to operate in dynamic environments,
and social conventions provide the necessary degree of mutual support. Thus,




These assertions are demonstrated by examining the multifarious social interactions which
occur as a consequence of the various types of goal relationships and goal interdependencies.
For each distinct case the central role of commitments, conventions and social conventions is
highlighted.
3.2.1 Commitments in Goal-Subgoal Relationships
If the goal being undertaken by a group of cooperating agents involves an “AND” relationship,
then all commitments to the sub-goals must be honoured if the parent goal is to succeed. If just
one agent reneges, then the other agents’ activities are doomed in their present form. Therefore
it is only the belief that others will honour their commitments that makes it rational for an
agent to carry out its part. Without this conﬁdence no agent would carry out its individual
processing, since achievement of the sub-goals in isolation is unlikely to bring it any beneﬁts.
Hence AND goals cannot be achieved by cooperative problem solving without the notion of
commitment.
If a goal is composed of a number of sub-goals, organised in an “OR” relationship, and these
are each assigned to different agents which all carry out their activities in parallel, then failure
of one agent to fulﬁll its commitment will not jeopardise achievement of the parent goal.
However if all the agents renege upon their obligations then the parent goal will not be
achieved; thus the commitment of at least one agent must be guaranteed. If agents coordinate
their activities more closely, and arrange for only one of the alternate sub-goals to be carried
out at any one time (to avoid needless duplication), then commitment failure can have serious
repercussions for the community’s overall level of coherence. For example, if a team agrees
that Agent1 will carry out the subgoal which fulﬁlls the parent goal G, then the remaining
agents can continue with their processing and can make subsequent commitments based on the
fact that G will indeed be achieved and that they do not have to expend resources towards this
end. However if Agent1 does not honour its pledge, then provided that G is still desired, one of
the other agents will have to carry out some unexpected processing activity. This additional
work may conﬂict with commitments which the agent has subsequently made and may result
in it having to delay, or even abandon, some of them because additional resources are
unexpectedly required to achieve G. Such delays may have a knock-on affect to other agents,
causing the community to operate ineffectively and requiring it to undertake a signiﬁcant
amount of replanning.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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3.2.2 Commitments in Goal Dependency Relationships
Consider the situation in which Agent1 and Agent2 have the respective interrelated goals G1
1
and G2
1. If there is a strong bi-directional dependence then both agents must honour their
commitments, otherwise neither of them will be able to achieve their objectives. If the relation
is strong but uni-directional (G1
1 → G2
1), then failure of Agent1 to honour its commitment
means that Agent2 will be unable to achieve G2
1 and it will either have to ﬁnd an alternative
path for achieving the parent goal or abandon it completely.
With weak dependencies, the agents involved may still be able to proceed but this may be in a
suboptimal manner. For example, an agent may have delayed processing an action on the
premise that an acquaintance will provide it with sufﬁcient information to signiﬁcantly speed
up its problem solving. If this information is no longer forthcoming, because the acquaintance
changed its commitments, then the agent has wasted potentially useful processing time. As
another example, an agent may select a certain path through the search space in the belief that
information which will be provided through a weak dependency will make this path less
expensive than its alternatives. But if the agent providing the information reneges upon its
commitment and the information is not forthcoming, then the chosen path may be suboptimal.
If the relationship is bi-directional and one agent fails to fulﬁll its pledge, the agent which is
still committed to its side of the bargain may be adversely affected since it chose to undertake
the goal believing that it would be able to proﬁt from the commitment of the other agent. In the
uni-directional case (G1
1→ G2
1) if Agent1 changes its mind, Agent2’s processing of G2
1 will
be adversely affected for the reason described above.
In both the weak and the strong uni-directional cases, if Agent2 drops its commitment to G2
1
then this may have a detrimental effect on Agent1. This is the case if Agent1 chose G1
1, even
though it was locally suboptimal, because the net utility to the community of the performance
of the pair {G1
1, G2
1} whilst satisfying the speciﬁed relationship was higher than if Agent1
chose an alternative to G1
1 and Agent2 chose G2
1. However the potential beneﬁts of Agent1’s
sacriﬁce were not observed because Agent2 failed to carry out its pledge about G2
1.
3.2.3 Social Conventions in Goal-Subgoal Relationships
Social conventions report changes in commitments to dependent agents and are especially
important when there is an “AND” relationship between a goal and its constituent sub-goals.
Without adequate information dissemination the other agents will remain committed to
performing their sub-goals even though they will not satisfy their original purpose of fulﬁlling
the parent goal. This is also the case for “OR” relationships in which only one of the sub-goals
is active at any one time. Adherence to a suitable convention provides a secondary degree of
conﬁdence in joint actions - the group believes that each individual will do their best to
perform their subpart, but if they are unable to keep their commitment then they must inform
their fellow team members of their change in state.
3.2.4 Social Conventions in Goal Dependency Relationships
In terms of interagent goal dependencies (G1
1 → G2
1), reports of changes in the status of
commitments are essential if the relationship is strong and bi-directional, and if Agent1 reneges
on its goal and the relation is strong and uni-directional. In all other cases reports on changes in
commitments are desirable in that they may enable the agent which is still committed to
reassess its position. This may result in it choosing a different path through the graph - eitherContribution to Foundations of DAI
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because it is freed from the constraint of having to honour the relationship or because it can no
longer beneﬁt from the interaction with the agent which is no longer committed.
3.2.5 The Basic Joint Action Convention, Joint Commitments and Joint Goals
With respect to joint actions, the most important feature of joint commitments and social
conventions is that they enable individuals to make assumptions about the actions of other
community members. They provide a degree of predictability to counteract the uncertainty
caused by the distribution of control. So for the joint goal G1,2
m, Agent2 can carry out G2
m,2 in
the knowledge that Agent1 is probably performing G1
m,1 and that, if it is not, then it will at
least be trying to inform it of this change (because of the basic joint action convention).
Without this assurance there would be no point in Agent2 even starting G2
m,2 since it is only
carrying out this activity to achieve the joint goal and the joint goal requires both sub-goals to
be fulﬁlled. Thus each agent is only carrying out its respective action because it believes that
the other is also doing its bit.
4. Common Coordination Techniques and their use of Commitments and Conventions
In this section three of the most common mechanisms for managing the coordination process
in DAI systems are presented and analysed - these include organisational structuring (section
4.1), exchanging meta-level information (section 4.2), and multi-agent planning (section 4.3).
For each technique there is a brief statement about how it facilitates the coordination of
behaviour, what its main characteristics are and how it can be reformulated in terms of the
centrality of commitments and conventions hypothesis.
4.1 Organisational Structures
In the context of DAI systems, an organisational structure can be viewed as a pattern of
information and control relationships between individuals (Gasser, 1992). These control
relationships, be they hierarchical, heterarchical or ﬂat, are responsible for designating the
relative authority of the agents and for shaping the types of social interaction which can occur.
For example, when building a community of agents for diagnosing faults in an electricity
network (Cockburn and Jennings, 1995), the system designer may specify a functional
organisation (agent1works on high voltage faults, while agent2 works at the low voltage level)
or a spatial organisation (agent1 deals with all types of faults in region1, agent2 with all types
of faults in region2). Concentrating on the spatial distribution, and assuming the interest areas
of the agents overlap, the authority relationships determine how redundances are avoided - in a
hierarchy, high level nodes inform the lower level ones of the activities they are to pursue;
whereas in a ﬂat structure this process is only achievable through direct negotiation between
the parties concerned.
The relationships speciﬁed by the organisational structures give general, long-term
information about the agents and the community as a whole. They aid the coordination process
by specifying which actions an individual will undertake and by providing a means of dividing
up the search space without having to go into detail about the particular sub-trees. Other
authors have followed this basic approach using different terminology - Singh (1990) employs
the notion of “strategies” to provide an abstract speciﬁcation of the behaviour of an agent or a
group and Werner (1989) uses “roles” for describing expectations about individual behaviour.
Shoham and Tennenholtz (1992) propose a more detailed organisational form which they term
a “social law”. With this approach, the society adopts a set of laws (eg road traffic rules) which
specify how individuals should behave. Each programmer is then committed to obeying theseContribution to Foundations of DAI
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laws when building his individual agent. The design process is simplified because it can be
assumed that all the other agents will adhere to the specified law.
As a speciﬁc illustration of this approach consider the Distributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed
(Decker, 1995) which simulates a spatially organised community of agents performing a
distributed interpretation to track vehicles moving amongst them. Each agent decides which
areas of the search space to explore based upon its current local view and its organisational
knowledge of its role in the community. In this context, coordination consists of two
concurrent activities: the construction and maintenance of a community-wide organisational
structure, and the continuous elaboration of this structure into precise activities using the local
knowledge and control capabilities of each agent. The organisation itself is speciﬁed as a set of
“interest areas” and as a set of priority ratings. The former indicate what, when and to whom
information should be sent; the latter indicate how to evaluate the importance of processing
different types of goals. The authority relationships indicate the relative priorities which
should be attached to processing externally generated goals versus local goals.
When an agent undertakes a particular role within an organisation it is, in fact, making a high-
level commitment about the types of activity it will pursue. For instance in the electricity
management scenario, if agent1 undertakes the role of diagnosing high-voltage faults, other
agents will expect it to undertake work in this area. They will make subsequent decisions in
their local problem solving based on the assumption that agent1 will indeed be dealing with all
the faults on the high voltage network.
Although they are relatively long-term structures, it has been shown that different
organisations are appropriate for different problem situations and performance requirements
(Malone, 1987). Hence as a situation evolves, the community may need to periodically
reassess its structure to determine whether it is still appropriate or whether a rearrangement
would be beneﬁcial - see the work of Ishida et al. (1990) for an illustration of the dynamic
reorganisation of a group of cooperating agents in response to changes in the environment. In
the electricity management scenario, for example, the community may decide that it is best to
replace the agent carrying out high-voltage diagnosis with several spatially distributed agents
so that the load and the reliance upon any one individual is reduced. This evaluation
corresponds to a convention for the organisational structure.
4.2 Meta-Level Information Exchange
Meta-level information exchange involves agents sending each other control level information
about their current priorities and focus (Gasser, 1992). For example in the functionally
distributed electricity management scenario described in the previous subsection, agent1,
which is working on the low voltage network, may indicate that it believes the most important
fault is in region1. Upon receiving this information, agent2, which is working on the high-
voltage network, may also decide to concentrate its efforts on this region to determine whether
the fault being experienced on the low voltage network is in fact a manifestation of a problem
with the high voltage system (eg no supply is getting through).
Durfee (1995) has developed a meta-level information exchange mechanism, called Partial
Global Planning, in which agents build and share local plans as a means of identifying
potential improvements to coordination. These partial global plans (PGPs) are exchanged by
agents as a means of building representations of their acquaintances’ activities - they indicate
which goals will be pursued and in what order, what results will be achieved and how long
each goal is likely to take. Individual community members then use a model of themselves andContribution to Foundations of DAI
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a representation of their acquaintances to identify when agents have PGPs whose objectives
are part of some larger community effort. If such complementary activities are detected, the
related PGPs are combined into a single, larger PGP which provides a more complete view of
the group’s activities. Agents can then revise their other PGPs to reflect the new position. As a
specific example, a PGP could indicate that the outcome of one agent’s task provides useful
predictive information for an acquaintance. This expectation, together with the accompanying
transmission of the information, would then be explicitly represented in the PGP, resulting in a
plan to use information resources more effectively. As a second example, an agent may survey
its current view of community-wide PGPs and identify acquaintances which are being under
utilised, whilst there are others which are overburdened. By modifying the relevant PGPs, the
agent could propose how the community could transfer subproblems so as to work better as a
team.
Meta-level information exchange is a medium term source of knowledge about an agent’s
commitments - shorter than organisation structures but longer than multi-agent planning
approaches (section 4.3). It enhances coordination only to the degree to which it is accurate -
indeed inaccurate information may be more detrimental than no information at all. Again it can
be seen that once an agent indicates it will work in a particular region of the search space, it is
important to honour that commitment - failure to do so will result in misleading information
being spread around the network and incoherent problem solving. However, as with the other
approaches, commitments should not be irrevocable; some form of convention is needed for
monitoring their progression. With the PGP approach, for example, agents often altered their
local plans, either because new tasks arrived or because actions took longer than expected, and
so their commitments needed to be updated. However if agents informed each other of every
minor change in their commitments, it could cause a chain-reaction which spreads throughout
the system. Therefore agents adopted an implicit convention in which they informed their
acquaintances only when the deviations were deemed significant.
4.3 Multi-Agent Planning
With the multi-agent planning approach to coordination, agents usually form a plan which
specifies all their future actions and interactions with respect to achieving a particular
objective. It details, before execution commences, the areas of the search space that will be
traversed and the route each agent should take at each decision point in the activity5. Multi-
agent plans are typically built to avoid inconsistent or conflicting actions, particularly with
respect to the consumption of scarce resources.
Multi-agent planning differs from organisational structuring and meta-level information
exchange in terms of the level of detail to which it specifies every agent’s activities. With this
approach, agents know in advance exactly what actions they will take, what actions their
acquaintances will take and what interactions will occur. By requiring such a complete
specification of behaviour, the plans can only realistically have a short time horizon because of
problems with the unpredictability and dynamicity of events in the environment. As plan
construction has to take into account all the possible choice points the agent would have
reached, without the benefit of constraining information from actual execution, this approach
often requires substantially more computational and communication resource than the other
two mechanisms.
 5.Partial global planning differs from multi-agent planning in that the former does not require the agents to reach
mutual agreements about all of their activities before they start acting. Indeed because the partial plans can change
so fluidly and because it takes time to propagate changes such agreements may never be attained.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
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There are two basic approaches to multi-agent planning: centralised and distributed. Georgeff
(1983) built a system in which the plans of individual agents were developed separately and
then sent to a central coordinator which analysed them to identify potential interactions. The
coordinator then identified those interactions which had the potential to cause conflicts and
grouped the sequences of unsafe actions to create critical regions. Finally, communication
primitives were inserted into the individual plans so that the agents synchronised their
activities appropriately. Cammarata et al. (1983) also devised a centralised multi-agent
planning system (for the air traffic control domain). In their system, each aircraft (agent) sends
the coordinator information about its intended actions. The coordinator then builds a plan
which specifies all of the agents’ actions, including the actions that they, or some other node,
should take to avoid collisions. With distributed multi-agent planning, the plan is developed by
several agents. This means there may be no one individual with a view of the entire
community’s activities and hence detecting and resolving undesirable interactions becomes
significantly more difficult. Corkill (1979) devised a distributed hierarchical planner based on
NOAH (Sacerdoti, 1977) where agents represent each other using MODEL nodes and plan
execution is coordinated by using explicit synchronisation primitives. Rosenschein and
Genesereth (1985) used a logic-based approach to study how agents with a common goal, but
different local knowledge, could exchange information to converge on identical plans.
Once a plan has been devised, the agents involved are committed to performing the specified
actions. If they believed that their acquaintances are unlikely to keep their pledges, then they
would not enter the planning phase in the first place because it is such a resource consuming
activity. Commitments are, therefore, the foundation of this approach. There is no latitude for
deviation from the agreed course of action because it may introduce resource conflicts or other
undesirable side-effects which would impair the community’s performance. However the
situation may change so radically between generation and execution that if the plan was
performed the benefit would be negligible or even negative. In this case it is worth entering a
replanning phase to produce a more profitable alternative (Kambhampati and Hendler, 1992;
Pollack, 1992). Hence there is a need for conventions to determine when replanning is
necessary and whether the existing plan should be reused or whether a fresh plan should be
devised.
5. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the process of coordination is built upon four main structures -
commitments, conventions, social conventions and local reasoning capabilities. Furthermore it
has hypothesised that all coordination mechanisms can be expressed using these concepts; to
demonstrate this point three of the most common coordination techniques have been
reformulated in these terms.
Having posited the key structures it is important that the model is reﬁned in order to more
precisely discriminate between a number of different types of social interaction. This
reﬁnement should be undertaken by two parallel strands of work: (i) by building DAI
applications which explicitly use these concepts (see Huang et al., 1994 for an illustration from
the domain of distributed patient care); and (ii) by producing more precise models of some of
the key concepts (see Wooldridge and Jennings (1994) for a ﬁrst formulation of commitments
and conventions using a quantiﬁed multi-modal logic). This subsequent work should aim to
address the following issues:
• Produce a ﬁner grain classiﬁcation of the types of goal interdependencyContribution to Foundations of DAI
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• Provide a methodology for designing appropriate conventions and social conventions
• Characterise the process by which social conventions are agreed
• Provide mechanisms which support robust coordination in the face of uncertainty about
the social convention which is in operation during a given interaction
• Provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of different conventions in various
environmental and domain circumstances
• Provide a means of characterising the local reasoning which is required to support
coordinated behaviour
Acknowledgement
This is a reﬁned and updated version of the paper which appeared in The Knowledge
Engineering Review.
References
Becker, H. S., (1960) “Notes on the Concept of Commitment” American Journal of Sociology
66 (1) pp 32-40.
Bond, A. H., (1989) “Commitment: Some DAI insights from Symbolic Interactionist Society”
Proc. of 9th Workshop on Distributed AI, Bellevue, WA, pp 239-261.
Bratman, M. E., (1987) “Intention, Plans and Practical Reason” Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. E., (1992) “Shared Cooperative Activity” The Philosophical Review 101 (2) pp
327-341.
Cammarata, S., McArthur, D., and Steeb, R., (1983) “Strategies of Cooperation in Distributed
Problem Solving” Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on AI, Karlsruhe, Germany, pp 767-770.
Clearwater, S. H., Huberman, B. A., and Hogg, T., (1991) “Cooperative Solution of Constraint
Satisfaction Problems” Science 254 pp 1181-1184.
Cockburn, D., and Jennings, N. R., (1995) “ARCHON: A Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence
System for Industrial Applications” in this volume.
Cohen, P. R., and Levesque, H. J., (1990) “Intention is Choice with Commitment” Artificial
Intelligence 42 pp 213-261.
Cohen, P. R., and Levesque, H. J., (1991) “Teamwork” Noûs 25 (4) pp 487-512.
Corkill, D. D., (1979) “Hierarchical Planning in a Distributed Environment”, Proc. Sixth Int.
Joint Conf. on AI, Cambridge, MA., pp 168-175.
Corkill, D. D., and Lesser, V. R., (1986) “The Use of Meta-Level Control for Coordination in
a Distributed Problem Solving Network” Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on AI, Karlsruhe, Germany, pp
748-756.
Decker, K., (1995) “Distributed Artificial Intelligence Testbeds”, in this volume.Contribution to Foundations of DAI
19
Dennett, D. C., (1987) “The Intentional Stance” MIT Press.
Durfee, E. H., (1995) “Planning in Distributed Artificial Intelligence” in this volume.
Durfee, E. H., Lesser, V. R., and Corkill, D. D., (1987) “Coherent Cooperation among
Communicating Problem Solvers” IEEE Trans. on Computers 36 pp 1275-1291.
Durfee, E. H., Lesser, V. R., and Corkill, D. D, (1989) “Trends in Cooperative Distributed
Problem Solving” IEEE Trans. on Knowledge and Data Engineering 1 (1) pp 63-83.
Durfee, E. H., and Montgomery, T. A., (1991) “Coordination as Distributed Search in a
Hierarchical Behaviour Space” IEEE Trans. on Systems Man and Cybernetics 21 pp 1363-
1378.
Fikes, R. E., (1982) “A Commitment-Based Framework for Describing Informal Cooperative
Work” Cognitive Science 6 pp 331-347.
Galbraith, J., (1973) “Designing Complex Organizations” Addison-Wesley.
Gasser, L., (1992) “DAI Approaches to Coordination” in Distributed Artificial Intelligence:
Theory and Praxis (eds. N. M. Avouris and L. Gasser) Kluwer Academic Publishers pp 31-51.
Georgeff, M. P., (1983) “Communication and Action in Multi-Agent Planning” Proc. of
National Conf. on AI, Washington, DC, pp 125-129.
Gerson, E. M., (1976) “On Quality of Life” American Sociological Review 41 pp 793-806.
Grosz, B. J., and Sidner, C. L., (1990) “Plans for Discourse” in Intentions in Communication,
(eds P.R.Cohen, J.Morgan and M.E.Pollack), pp 417-444, MIT Press.
Huang, J., Jennings, N. R., and Fox, J., (1994) “Cooperation in Distributed Medical Care”
Proc. Int. Conf. on Cooperative Information Systems, Toronto, Canada.
Huberman, B. A., and Hogg, T., (1988) “The Behaviour of Computational Ecologies” in The
Ecology of Computation (ed. B. A. Huberman), pp 77-115, North Holland.
Kambhampati, S., and Hendler, J. A., (1992) “A Validation Structure Based Theory of Plan
Modification and Reuse” Artificial Intelligence 55 pp 193-258.
Kornﬁeld, W. A., and Hewitt, C. E., (1981) “The Scientiﬁc Community Metaphor” IEEE
Trans. on Systems Man and Cybernetics, 11 (1) pp 24-33.
Ishida, T., Yokoo, M., and Gasser, L., (1990) “An Organisational Approach to Adaptive
Production Systems”,Proc of 8th National Conf. on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Boston, USA, pp 52-
58.
Jennings, N. R., (1992) “Towards a Cooperation Knowledge Level for Collaborative Problem
Solving” Proc. 10th European Conf. on AI, Vienna, Austria, pp 224-228.
Jennings, N. R., (1993) “Commitments and Conventions: The Foundation of Coordination in
Multi-Agent Systems” The Knowledge Engineering Review 8 (3) pp 223-250.
Jennings, N. R., (1994) “Controlling Cooperative Problem Solving in Industrial Multi-AgentContribution to Foundations of DAI
20
Systems using Joint Intentions” Artiﬁcial Intelligence.
Jennings, N. R., and Mamdani, E. H., (1992) “Using Joint Responsibility to Coordinate
Collaborative Problem Solving in Dynamic Environments” Proc. 10th National Conf. on AI,
San Jose, CA., pp 269-275.
Kinny, D. N., and Georgeff, M. P., (1991) “Commitment and Effectiveness of Situated Agents”,
Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on AI, Sydney, Australia, pp 82-88.
Kinny, D., Ljungberg, M., Rao, A., Sonenberg, E., Tidhar, G., and Werner, E., (1992) “Planned
Team Activity” Proceedings of the 4th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents
in a Multi-Agent World, Rome, Italy.
Lesser, V. R., (1991) “A Retrospective View of FA/C Distributed Problem Solving”, IEEE
Trans. on Systems Man and Cybernetics 21 pp 1347-1363.
Lesser, V. R., and Corkill, D. D, (1987) “Distributed Problem Solving” in Encyclopedia of AI
(ed S. C. Shapiro), pp 245-251, John Wiley and Sons.
Malone, T. W., (1987) “Modelling Coordination in Organizations and Markets” Management
Science 33 pp 1317-1332.
Pollack, M. E., (1992) “The Uses of Plans” Artificial Intelligence 57 pp 43-68.
Rao, A. S., Georgeff, M. P., and Sonenberg, E. A., (1992) “Social Plans: A Preliminary Report”,
in Decentralised A I 3 (eds. E. Werner and Y. Demazeau), North Holland, pp 57-76.
Rosenschein, J. S., and Genesereth, M. R., (1985) “Deals among Rational Agents”, Proc. 9th
Int. Joint Conf. on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Los Angeles, USA, pp 91-99
Sacerdoti, E. D., (1977) “A Structure for Plans and Behaviour” Elsevier.
Searle, J. R., (1983) “Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind” Cambridge University
Press.
Searle, J. R., (1990) “Collective Intentions and Actions” in Intentions in Communication, (Eds
P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack), pp 401-416, MIT Press
Shoham, Y., and Tennenholtz, M., (1992) “On the Synthesis of Useful Social Laws for
Artificial Agent Societies”, Proc of 10th National Conf. on AI, San Jose, USA, pp 276-28.
Singh, M. P., (1990) “Group Intentions” Proc. of 10th Int. Workshop on Distributed AI, Texas,
MCC Technical Report ACT-AI-355-90.
Tuomela, R., and Miller, K., (1988) “We-Intentions” Philosophical Studies 53 pp 367-389.
Werner, E., (1989) “Cooperating Agents: A Unified Theory of Communication and Social
Structure” in Distributed Artificial Intelligence Vol II (eds. L. Gasser and M. N. Huhns), pp 3-
36.
Wooldridge, M. J., and Jennings, N. R., (1994) “The Cooperative Problem Solving Process: A
Formal Model” Knowledge Engineering Applications Group Technical Report, Dept.
Electronic Engineering, Queen Mary & Westfield College.